

AN
ADMONITION
TO
MY LORD
PROTECTOR

AND HIS
COUNCIL,
Of their present Danger.

WITH
The means to secure him and his POSTERITY in
their present Greatnesse: With the generall Ap-
plause and lasting Tranquillity of the
NATION.



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THE
P R E F A C E.

MY LORD,

My passionate inclinations to the lasting peace of my Countrey, have made me so presumptuous, as to prescribe to your Highness and Council a more perfect remedy for its ill healed wounds, than I have yet seen applied: But I would not be thought so impudent, as to offer at the instruction of so great Masters in the Art of Government, but onely to put you in mind of those things, that the multiplicity of your greater Affairs have made you forget to consider. And lest your Highness should want leasure to peruse the papers of an obscure and unknown person, I thought fit to commit them to the Press, that some of your Council or Friends (at least) may inform your Highness how much is pertinent in them not doubting but you will think those more your friends, that give you a timely notice of your own and your Countreys danger, than those, who by a servile flattery, becalm you to your ruine; which none shall be more ambitious handsomely to prevent, then,

My Lord,

Your most humble, and faithfull
Servant,

J. H.

AN ADMONITION

TO MY

LORD PROTECTOR,

*and his Council, of their present
danger, &c.*



O begin such a businesse as this methodically, we are first to shew the just Exceptions the people and Souldiery have to this plausible elective form of Government, so well intended by your Highnesse and Council; next those to your persons, which the dangers ensuing thereupon to your selves and the Nation: And lastly, the only means of a totall and lasting prevention.

And I must ingenuously confesse, that there is so much seeming reason to preferre the continuall Election of wise and gallant men, before the Succession of Kings or Protectors, who may possibly prove Children, or Fools, or Tyrants, or Cowards, that it may seem a wonder that the experience of all Nations hath not driven them to the specious form of Elective Monarchies.

But the tryals they have had, have beaten them to the contrary; for though the renown of your Highnesses many victories and great abilities, with your long and prosperous prepossession of the Generallship, did silence the ambitious pretences of any Competitors in your Election, yet we must no more look for a man that hath no Equals after your Highnesse: for the most eminent sort of men, are as near of a size in wit and courage, as they are in stature; and as they are equals in virtue, so will they be in interest, at least their factions will be so near an equality, that the weaker in an Army may by his cunning and industry draw in other factions from amongst the people to increase his numbers, upon the common specious pretences of a Reformation in Religion

and Government agreeable to those peoples humours whom he courts, and so prepare himself to decide his pretensions by a Civil Warre, which I may justly call the great Sea of calamities, that swallows up all the streams of other petty tyrannies, as not worth a name, in respect of the ruinous inundations of that many-headed Monster, which commonly ushers in a Forraigner with it to make our miseries almost immortall.

And that this is like to be our sad fate upon the *Election* of every *Protector*, is as certain, as that all men (whether honest, or dishonest) have naturally an ambition to get as much power as they can to oblige or disoblige; and considering how naturally men overvalue themselves, I think the designs of ambitious men to be commonly just in their own thoughts, out of the Confidence they have of themselves, of excelling others in good Government. But that those gallant men who run so many hazards to build up your *Highness* greatness, should not adventure as far for themselves apart, after your *Highness* death, were the greatest miracle that I have known.

And to confirm this by an ancient example or two of the wisest and most civilized people then in reputation in the world; we will begin with the great *Alexander*, who at his death (it seems intending an *Election* amongst themselves) told his great Officers, that he would leave his *Empire* to the worthiest: but they could so ill agree who that was, that they divided that invincible Army, and each seizing upon what he could, fought it out, till they were all destroyed but *Seleucus* and *Ptolemy*. And so after the death of *Julius Caesar*, was the *Roman Empire* rent by the dissensions of *Augustus*, *Anthony*, and *Lepidus*, till the fortune of *Augustus* prevailed. And in the declining of the *Roman Empire* there were severall times as many Emperours as the Legions in severall Provinces were pleased to set up, which were sometimes three or four together for, want of a due succession. And to come home to the present *German Empire*, though it be in effect Hereditary to the House of *Austria*, yet the very pretence to a free election was the principall cause of calling in the King of *Sweden*, and reducing that strong and flourishing Empire to such a wilderness as now it is. And doubtlesse, all Governments were to be rejected as pernicious tyrannies, were it not for avoiding the tyranny of Confusion, which subjects the Lives and Fortunes of every particular man to any small number of Rogues that shall assemble at such a time of Liberty. If then the publick peace be the chief end of all Governments,

ments, those *Formes* must needs be the worst which are most subject to decline to *Factions*, though they do not immediately do so; and of *Monarchies* no doubt but the *elective* is most lyable to this Confusion.

And though it may be objected, that the follie of a weak hereditary King may introduce the same inconvenience: I shall answer, first, that there is seldome such a King; for their extraordinary educations make them knowing men, if it finds them not such. But if he be a fool or coward, he hath subjects under him fit to command Armies, and no doubt a wise Council of his predecessors, who knows how to Humor and govern him as well as any of his fellow fools; And if he be a child, his minority most commonly proves peaceable, if his Title be unquestionable. But it may be said he may prove a Tyrant: and that I must confess, but so may an Elective Monarch, though he seem a lamb at his first entry; I am sure he hath more reason to be so, because he hath more of his equals or superiors in birth to fear. And if we look upon other differences of these two kinds of Kings, we shall find the Elective King more necessitated to exhaust the people, both in respect of the charge of gaining and securing his present power, and leaving his posterity like the children of a Monarch, and so the Treasury shall be alwayes emptied into private purses, and the people anew exhausted by the next hungry Prince with his necessitous kindred and dependents. So that I must conclude that every Election doth certainly threaten the worst of evils, and that the inconveniences of a succession are farre lesse, & do very seldome happen by the concurrence of many ill accidents together. And I think this may serve for demonstration of the peoples exceptions, who judge by the pressures they feel. And now let us examine the distastes of the souldiery and people together to your Highness person, and I doubt we shall finde that the greater their love and admiration once was, the more is now their hatred & your Highness danger: for they then looked upon you as a zealous reformer not onely of Tyranny, but of the very causes of it; and (though you acted beyond their reasons) they thought it was because you had more reason then they, and so with an implicate faith they expected from your Highness such a settlement, as should recompense their great expence of blood and treasure. But after the spirit had moved you to break your Oaths of allegiance and supremacy (which you took with all the Members at your first entrance into Parliament) & after that your trust from the two houses upon the score
of

of the Covenant, and since again to destroy the King, weed the Parliament, and at last tear it up by the roots, and they in the end see no other fruits of bloud and perjury, but the giving laws like a Conqueror, and imposing that kind of Government upon the souldiery which they have fought against, and indeed a worse: what can be feared from such a deluded Army and people, but that they should as boldly draw their swords together against a Protector, as the Presbyterians and all sorts of Independents did formerly against the King, notwithstanding their own differences in opinion? Certainly they will be as little scrupulous of murdering a Monarch by his own Law, as one by all the Laws of the Land established, and will think your *Highnesse* as guilty of the bloudshed of the *Nation*, as they once thought the *King*. And there is no question but the people, who find their *Taxes* and *Dangers* perpetuated (which were inconsiderable when they first quarrelled with them) will be as forward to assist the souldiery, as they can wish them. And I think this generall dilaffection or the people was so evident to your *Highnesse*, before they were exasperated by the death of the *King* or *Parliament*, that you need not doubt their unanimous insurrection, if they shall be prepared and countenanced in it, when the people of *single Counties* ventured their *lives* and *fortunes* so freely as they did before the *Kings death*; where it is remarkable, that a remnant of the broken and discouraged people of *Kent*, with some small additions in *Essex*, were able to divert my Lord *Fairfaxes* Army at *Colchester* three moneths together; if the *Nation* had been then prepared for a generall insurrection in a day, it is probable your *Highnesse glories* had been nipped in the bud, notwithstanding your renowned *victories* against the *Scots* at that time. But it may be asked, why the people did not shew this readinesse when the *Scots* with their *King* came to *Worcester*: and the Answer is, that their coming was unexpected, and in such hast, as shewed they rather came to seek then give protection, and the fore-laid designs, if there were any, were (as was then pretended) discovered: But howsoever, there was little more then was requisite for dispersing of *Orders* between the day of their arrivall at *Worcester*, and that of their defeat.

But the grand *Objection* is, that the fear of the *Common Enemy* (the *King*) will alwayes keep the *Souldiery* at unicity in their *Obedience* under your *Highnesse*; but I answer, that if a few of them should but resolve to murder your *Highnesse*, and one

one or two more of your principal *Officers*, which no doubt they may easily and securely do, they would finde time enough to settle any form of Government they pleased, before the *Common Enemy* (who hath neither *Money*, *Shipping*, *Arms*, nor *Friends* abroad, nor any footing in this Nation) could give them any disturbance. And how far zeal may prompt those who are *religious*, & the ambition of sharing the Government those of no *Religion*, a wise man ought to fear. But admit the *King* were landed, and considerable, the *Souldiery* very well known by experience, how welcome even particular men are that revolt to an enemy in a doubtfull condition; much more great bodies, which may not onely make what advantagious conditions they please for themselves, but may impose upon him stricter limitations of his power, than your *Highnesse* is now tied to by your *Protectorship*, and no doubt may retain any places of benefit or strength they shall then be possessed of, for security of performance of conditions. But if the worst should happen, that he should come in a Conquerer without their help, they know that a few of the great Ones will onely be punished. For reason will lead any conquering Tyrant (for his own security) to sweeten the multitude with a general pardon and Act of Oblivion; and for any *scruples*, they may have of betraying your *Highnesse Trust*) I doubt they will be wiped away, by their apprehensions of your first breaking yours with *King*, *Parliament*, and *Army*, and so they may probably render you a *bloody requital* for the destruction of their *Fellow souldiers*, whom you call *Levellers*. Lastly, Consider the *fondnesse* of the *people*, to their *Old Forms of Religion*, as well as *Government*, which you have abolished without giving the *liberty* to tender *Consciences*, they expected, and your *Highnesse* will conclude with me, that the world affords you few others than *Enemies* at home, and *Emulators* abroad. And if I have told you

nothing but *truth*. I doubt not but your generosity will think me more worthy of *thanks*, than any of your *Flatterers*, especially if I propose a just, safe, and honourable remedy for the *mischiefs* that threaten your *Highness* and the *Nation*. And now having sufficiently opened the wounds, I shall apply the promised Cure. And it is not the lessening of your *Highness* in any thing, for I am one of those that believe *Monarchy* to be the best form of *Government*, so as it be hereditary. For admit a *Monarch* be a *Tyrant*, his *Tyranny* is mortal, and his care will be greater not to offend than of a multitude of *Governors*, who may lay faults upon one another, and are as subject to *cruelty* and *avarice* as the single person; so that it is better to be preyed upon by one *Family* with its *dependents*, than by three or four hundred with theirs, and we may easier please the one, and have *justice* of him, than of the *slow* and *factious* great *Body*, who must most of them joyn to oblige, and yet any one can by his *mis-information* disoblige, because the accused shall be branded with the Title of a *Malignant*, when they have not so much as leisure to hear him. And since an arbitrary power will be in all *Governments* in those that have the possession of the *Militia*, it is better both for *defence* and *offence*, that the General and civil *Magistrate* should be all one, than that a gallant *Army* and *Nation* should be ruined, as *Hannibal* and his *Carthaginians* were by the delatory and malicious practices of *Hanno*, a Senator with his Faction.

But to return to our purpose, for the satisfaction of all interests, and first for the Souldiery, because they have fought hard for it, I should propose to your *Highness* to have all Officers of the Army above the degree of Captains to have votes in your *Highness* Council of State, at those times that they are free from their more urgent employments in the field. So will each souldier of the Army be sure to endeavour by his extraordinary deserts to rise by degrees to the

the State preferment he sees his Officers so justly rewarded, with.

Then for this next Parliament (though they should not have power to alter the Government) I could wish your Highnesse and Council would consult with them about your late establishment, and hear what objections they have against it. And if the Parliament and Army should joyn in a petition to this purpose, I presume you would not deny it. And it were better to offer at acts of Grace before they were asked.

Lastly, if my reasons for an hereditary Monarchy be satisfactory, I most humbly beseech your Highnesse and Council to consider whether the establishment of the succession after your Highnesse in an usurping line, will not expose the Nation to all the miseries I have mentioned in an elective government: and if this be doubted, be pleased to look over our own Chronicles, and you shall finde variety of examples, without going further then the time of the Conquest. For first, *Harrold* by his usurpation encouraged and occasioned the Conquest of *England*; then was there another deluge of blood occasioned by the usurpation of *Henry* the first; and again what slaughters and rapines did this miserable Nation endure by the unjust ambition of King *Stephen* in detaining the Crown from *Maud* the Empreffe, which fire could not be quenched but by the succession of her son the right heir, which was at last agreed to by King *Stephen*. But to come nearer home, you shall find that *Henry* the fourth saw his Country bleed in his life-time for his usurpation, though he came in with the general good liking of the people, and thought he had secured himself by the Kings Murther. But though his industry secured the Crown to his son, yet was his sons death conspired by his principal friends, just as he was setting out for the invasion of *France*. But that conspiracy being de-

rected, he by his unparalleled virtues and successes, and the
 weaknes of the true heir, avoided during his short life
 any storms at home. But they fell most heavily upon our
 flourishing Country in his Successor *Henry* the sixths time,
 who could never have lost the Crown by his weaknes if his
 title had been good; as appeareth by the notable contenti-
 on between him and *Edward* 4. but between them were
 many thousands of Orphans and Widows left weeping o-
 ver their own and countries desolate and bloody ruines; &
 at last the ambition of *Henry* the 4. was justly punished in
 the ruine of his Grandchilde, and a hatefull memory for
 his unjust Ambition, and the sad consequences of it. But if
 these examples do not sufficiently convince, the reason of
 the thing doth, for there will alwayes be a conscientious &
 a necessitous party for the true heir in any Nation against
 an Usurper; besides malecontents, which are still the grea-
 test number, because many must necessarily be injured, and
 more unrewarded that think they deserve it, and even all
 men that are unconcerned will be for the true heir, and be
 pretended lovers of Justice, and with much reason must
 hate presidents of wrong, least they should some other time
 suffer it. And so I may conclude, we are as certain of a civil
 war from an unjust succession, as from an Elective Govern-
 ment, and the incomparable miseries and ill consequences
 of that I have already declared, tho our own experience
 might partly have saved me the labour. But your Highnes
 may think an invincible Fleet a sufficient security, for an I-
 land against a Forreign Nation, that may interpose at such
 a time of our distractions. But I answer, that if none of
 your shipping should revolt, yet might our next neighbors
 the *French* (if they should then make peace with their o-
 ther enemies) take the opportunity of the same storm that
 shall force your Fleet in the Winter into Harbors to blow
 them over the short passage into *England*, if they have any
 party to secure their landing here.

But

But if this be thought frivolous, I suppose I have said enough besides to make appear that the true interest of your Highnesse and your Posterity with that of this Kingdom, is to think of a treaty with *Charles Stuart*, if he'll accept of the Crown after you decease upon the same terms you now hold it, I mean the same Council and limitation of power, with a competent maintenance for him in the mean time, in some such remote place as you shall need lesse to fear him then you do now, if he should incline to the breach of such an agreement, as may be secured by Oath, Hostages, and by the mediation of such States whose interest it is (in respect of their greater neighbours) to be alwayes friends to the peace of *England*, and by stricter ties than are here necessary to be mentioned; besides the honesty, discretion and temper of the young man, (who notwithstanding his great courage) shews he inherits the mildness of his Father and Grandfather on the one side, and of his Mother and Grandfather on the other side, which Great King *Henry the fourth* of *France* after he had victoriously broken the heart of that great Rebellion called the *Catholique League*, notwithstanding received the onely head of it then living the Duke of *Main*, into his protection and favour, and never took the least revenge of him or any other of that rebellious crew in all the time of his reign. But above all things the Kings own interest and the good of his Countrey will oblige him to bury his resentments, and both to accept and keep such conditions as redeem him and his followers from misery at the present, & secure him & his posterity in the end to the re-enjoiments of all their rights, without the slaughter or destruction of any part of his kingdoms, which he is most tenderly sensible of. And what doubt can there be but that he will rather expect quietly the decease of an old man (as your Highnesse is) than run an improbable hazard of all his fortunes for a few years, which he must have stayed for till his fathers death, if he had not been un-

timely cut off: and that he was willing to do so, your Highness knows, by his pious and earnest solicitation then to you & the rest of the Officers then with you for the saving of his life. And let me add a very little trial of him, when *Wiseman* and others proposed your murder to him, he refused to consent to it, notwithstanding his interest, and the exasperation of his wants; how then should he be feared when those motives are taken away?

But admit this were not so, you have still all the power in your own hands, and would have the affections of the people (which he now hath) if he should be perfidious to their disquiet anew. If then it be clear that you are secure on the Kings side, where lies the danger of this accommodation? it is the undoubted interest of the military men to be alwayes governed by a Monarch, especially if they be well provided of subordinate places under him, and the people are so passionately affected to the old line, as their only constant security from rapine and bloodshed, that they will never be at rest till they have an opportunity to destroy the rooter up of these three great fences, of their Religion, Laws, and that unquestionable succession which would intirely secure them from any more disputes; and even most of those that formerly fancied better forms of Government, are now for falling into the old channel, out of despair of drawing the peoples affections to their fancies, without which they know the peace of the Nation can never be long preserved. If your Highness should yet prove one of that number, your name would be as good as it is great: for a man may be thought reasonably to undertake indirect courses for a great and publick good, so as he leave those courses when he sees his end is not to be compassed. And if your Highness do so, your curses will be turned into praises, and you may sleep again without any fear of your own guards, who otherwise are not like to
scruple

scruple the murthering of so unjust a master for a greater reward than you can give them, if the present seizure of your present treasure were not sufficient for them. For men of no *Religion* will at any time betray a person as wicked as themselves for their interest, and those that are zealous will do the same upon the score of *Justice*, and their *Oaths* and *Covenants* to other forms of persons; so that your *Highness* can be secure of no body, nor any thing, but the rewards of *injustice* with infamy, for the preferring your *Sons* advancement before your *Countreys* security, who if he were planted can never be secured by any *Decrees* or *Oaths*, since both have been so commonly broken, and ought to be so, if unjustly made or taken; & if his virtues be never so great, his mere youth will make him be despised by those that have had the start of him in the *successes*, and the *affections* of the *Army*; and the seeming respect that is now paid him upon your *Highness* score, shall vanish with your *death*, and all your *Family* be destroyed (like that of the great *Alexanders*) by your own friends and followers, if you your self should scape such a cup of poison as he met with, or such a dagger as finished the ambition of *Julius Cæsar*: And now my Lord, for a Conclusion, give me leave to wonder at the ambition of all ill men, though they believe in no other world, since their ambition is to gain esteem, and how they should be esteemed and hated at once for the same fact, I know not, without a contradiction. If they did but consider how even wicked men hate one another for fear of receiving the same injuries from their companions, which they have inflicted together upon others, they would prefer the love and admiration of Mankind before the being admirably hated, which since your *Highness* may so easily do, and cannot with justice, honor and safety do any thing else, it shall no more be doubted from your generosity by

My LORD.

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